The purpose of this paper is to offer a preliminary sketch of a philosophical project. The project begins by arguing that there is a challenge addressed to contemporary philosophy, and that this challenge can be related to the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's views, especially in his later period.   Comment(1)
The acceptance of such a challenge depends, in my opinion, on the acceptance of the following points:

1. philosophical questions can be expressed only within natural language;
2. raising philosophical questions by using a natural language exceeds the "rules of language";
3. the rules of language use cannot (and don't need to) be explicitly stated; we can only provide local elucidation by giving examples of right and wrong language uses;
  Comment(2)

4. generally speaking, there is nothing like a metalanguage in which a theory of language likely to entail a consequence opposed to (3) could be formulated, and therefore no possibility to obtain systematic clarification.

 

With respect to these points, we have to show how each one of them is contained in, implied or assumed by Wittgenstein's view, and to critically evaluate the arguments that support them. In order to determine the scope of what I have called 'Wittgenstein's challenge' a supplementary thesis has to be considered, namely:

 

5. a philosophical activity which can be considered today an alternative to this challenge either disregards (1)-(4) – some or all of those points – or, by acceptance of (1)-(4), becomes an enterprise that cannot successfully satisfy the professional philosopher.
 Comment(3)


It might come out, at the end of this investigation, that this challenge actually exists. That is to say, there are sufficiently strong arguments for (1)-(4) to be found in Wittgenstein's writings, and a brief survey of the contemporary philosophical traditions may lead to (5). If this is the case, I advance the following hypothesis as a possible starting point for a reply to Wittgenstein's challenge:

 

6. The strongest point in this view is (4), which prevents an alternative account of natural language – opposed to the one suggested by Wittgenstein – from being a suitable answer to the challenge.
7. A refutation of (4) can be produced only by introducing the distinction between language and metalanguage, to make it acceptable from Wittgenstein's point of view in a way that needs further explanation.
  Comment(4)

I have to note – although it is questionable at present whether this situation is attainable or not – one thing: if by taking (6)-(7) for granted one cannot deal with the challenge introduced by (1)-(5) this may seriously endanger the philosophical concern of any reasonable philosopher.

None of the points above can be extensively analyzed here. In the following pages I intend to clarify (1)-(3) inasmuch as to make possible the argument that (4) is indeed related with Wittgenstein’s view. I concentrate on (4) mainly because, as suggested in (6), this point makes an answer to Wittgenstein’s challenge almost impossible. At the end of the paper I try to offer a preliminary and partial evaluation for my project.

This is a trivial truth. Even if one can ask questions by using a formal language (e.g., 4 + 3 = ?) it is hardly conceivable that these questions would be philosophical. There might be, however, a problem with this point. The way Wittgenstein himself uses the term "language" in his earlier writings differs from the way he uses the same term in his later works ("—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)" – Philosophical Investigations, I, 23). One may think, then, that sentence (1) has at least two different meanings, if considered from Wittgenstein’s vantage point. In order to avoid this, we have to notice that there are many instances throughout the entire work of Wittgenstein where "language" is not a philosophical concept, but an ordinary word (See, for instance: Philosophical Investigations, I, 120). It is the same case with the sentence (1) above.

Here we have to specify what "rules of the language" means. Perhaps, an efficient way to do this is to find analogous sentences for (2):

2.1 "Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language." (Tractatus, 4.003)

2.2 "[…] philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules according to which we are inclined to use words." (Philosophical Grammar, Part I, II, § 32)

2.3 "When philosophers use a word […] and try to grasp the essence of one thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?" (Philosophical Investigations, I, 116)

It should be noted that getting from (2.1) to (2.3) – and accordingly, from Wittgenstein’s earlier view to his later view – we seem to find less appropriate a sentence for translating (2) into his words. This is somehow explained by (3).

Sentence (3) can be related only with a certain period of Wittgenstein’s intellectual development, the period which is best represented by his Philosophical Investigations. Some kindred matters were much discussed under the title of rule-following. To get to this assertion from there, one has to accept that the rules for the language use are not like the rules for a calculus, that they are publicly formed, continuously changing and non-analyzable. Additionally, it has to be shown that semantic rules cannot be deduced from syntactic rules. The truth of (3) is disputable, but I do not wish to talk about that right now.

As stated above, the sentence could not belong to Wittgenstein. Yet, I wish to maintain, one of the deepest Wittgensteinean presuppositions is expressed by it. As a first remark, the hierarchy of languages seems to originate in the hierarchy of sets. This seems to be largely intuitive, if we think about Tarski’s exposition. On the other hand, Wittgenstein constantly rejects Russell’s theory of sets (Tractatus, 6.031; Remarks on The Foundation of Mathematics, V-29). He would never use either the formal apparatus provided by the theory of sets or the language-metalanguage distinction to solve a philosophical puzzle. The way he accounts for the antinomy of the liar, for instance, is totally different from the one adopted by Tarski (The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages; in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 2nd edition, pp. 157-9) or Russell (Principia Mathematica, 1st volume, p. 45): "Perhaps we should say of this man [the liar] that he doesn’t mean the same thing as we do by "true" and by "lying". He means perhaps something like: What he says flickers; or nothing really comes from his heart. It might also be said: his "I always lie" was not really an assertion. It was rather an exclamation." (Remarks on The Foundation of Mathematics, III-58).

I stated before that (3) is more susceptible to being attached to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Therefore, the same thing has to be said of the entire challenge introduced by him. If we focus our attention accordingly, we will find in his later writings some useful remarks for his presumable view on the language-metalanguage question. To take only a few: "A name has meaning, a proposition has sense in the calculus to which it belongs. The calculus is as it were autonomous. – Language must speak for itself." (Philosophical Grammar, Part I, II, § 27); "Philosophy is concerned with calculi in the same sense as it is concerned with thoughts, sentences and languages. But if it was really concerned with the concept of calculus, and thus with the concept of calculus of all calculi, there would be such a thing as metaphilosophy. (But there is not. We might so present all that we have to say that this would appear as a leading principle.)" (Philosophical Grammar, Part I, VII, § 72; compare with: "One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order." - Philosophical Investigations, I, 121); "In giving explanations I have already to use language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one); […] Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us? – Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask!" (Philosophical Investigations, I, 120; the italicization of "this" is mine.) Now, I do not take a series of quotations as an argument. What I wish to say is this: we cannot make sense of these sentences (or any other similar sentences to be found in Wittgenstein’s writings – see, for example, On Certainty, § 391, § 396) if we disregard the possibility of (4) being presupposed by Wittgenstein (As a remarkable side effect, one of the most intriguing affirmations from Tractatus, 6.54, gets its full meaning the same way). On the other side, there are no sayings in Wittgenstein to contradict the acceptance of (4) as a presupposition.

Now, one is entitled to ask: "But what about Wittgenstein himself? Doesn’t he speak about language too? Isn’t his theory about everyday language implicitly formulated in a metalanguage?" Two points should be noted here. First, language is spoken about as a phenomenon. It is not something different from other phenomena, something at a different level (See Philosophical Investigations, I, 108.) Secondly, Wittgenstein steadily distinguishes between saying and showing (Tractatus, 4.121-4122, for example), or – in other words – between explaining and describing (Philosophical Grammar, Part I, II, § 30, Philosophical Investigations, I, 124, 126). It is this distinction that allows him to "describe" the phenomenon of language use or to "show" something about language without constructing a theory of some object language in another language of a second order.

If the understatement of (4) in Wittgenstein’s view is plausible, then it becomes clear why there is not much to be discussed about (3). For the later Wittgenstein in particular, it does not make a statement-like point. It is not part of a theory about language at all.

One may consider (4) completely irrelevant for a philosophical challenge. Indeed, as a presupposition, it is not supported by any other claims. We have to note, however, that we are not in a position to require justifications. Wittgenstein’s view is fairly sound as such.   Comment(5)
More than that, the distinction between language and metalanguage is not introduced with respect to the natural language, which – according to (1) – is at stake here (See Tarski, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages; in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 2nd edition, p. 164.) Anyone who intends to ignore sentence (4) would have, therefore, to confront with it first.

I do not pretend that I offered a strong argument here, but this was not my aim. I would be content to know if I succeeded in making you suspect a threat which originates in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. And if there is at least one possible world in which a proficient philosopher develops that view to its full extent by adding constraining arguments to a set of assertions similar to (1)-(4), this should worry us all.

Russell, B. and Whitehead, A. N. (1910), Principia Mathematica, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarski, A. (1956), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (papers from 1923 to 1938), translated by J. H. Woodger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1922), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with translation by D. Pears and B. McGuinnes. London: Routledge.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations, Edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1956), Remarks on The Foundation of Mathematics (Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Matematik), Edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1979), On Certainty (Uber Gewissheit), Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.