There is a problem here, with (2), and (3), namely
that, granted the truth of (3), it appears impossible to argue
rationaly for (2). That is, you cannot speak of wrong use of
language without pointing out the rules which
are broken.
It seems to me that the problem comes from the fact
that (2) is more susceptible to be related with
Wittgenstein's earlier writings, while (3) expresses
Wittgenstein's later views. As belonging to Wittgenstein1,
(2) has a similar meaning with other assertions made by
logical positivist philosophers like Carnap, for instance
(the questions of metaphysics are pseudo-statements - they
cannot be soundly translated into a logical language formed
according to the logical syntax). Now, for Wittgenstein2
the phrase "rules of language" has a different meaning. It
is not that there are no rules by which we speak (a
language game is usually played by some grammatical rules,
which can be expressed in grammatical sentences), only that
these rules cannot be completely and systematically
enumerated. A reason is that they change over time,
depending on the shared agreement of the speakers. However,
Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of a
systematical approach to language are not important for the
point at stake here.
Now it is clear that the point (3) should be
stated rather like this:
(3') the rules of language use cannot (and don't need to) be
systematically stated in an exhaustive (final) theory; we can only
provide local elucidations by using local methods.
Sometimes the method consists in giving an example
for the normal use of a word, to contrast it with some
abnormal use, sometimes the example is constructed by
pushing a wrong analogy a little bit further, just to show
that it was wrong in the first place, other times the
elucidation is done by invoking a grammatical rule. To
someone which states that my computer is a donkey I might
reply by pointing out that computers are not animals.
"Computers are not animals" is, for Wittgenstein, a
grammatical sentence. It shows something about the way we
usually speak. Again, whether all the cases are reducible
to the later and the grammatical rules are in fact, pace
Wittgenstein, completely and systematically enumerable,
does not seem of much importance for this discussion.
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